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Nationalism and patriotism as determinants of European identity and attitudes towards the euro

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Abstract

The present study investigates national identity and European identity as determinants of attitudes towards the single European currency, the euro. It is assumed that support of the euro depends on a positive European identity which may be affected by patriotism and nationalism as different types of national identity. Sentimental and instrumental attachment to one's own nation, and optimistic expectations about Austrian future are included as determinants of patriotism and nationalism. A sample of 318 participants completed a questionnaire. Results give evidence for impacts of national and European identity on the attitudes towards the euro.

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1. Introduction

Attitudes towards a currency affect consumers' economic behaviour (Schmolders, 1984), and thus, the economy in general (Katona and Strümpel, 1984). While negative attitudes and decreasing trust in the national currency may lead to immediate consumption and investments abroad, optimism should encourage saving behaviour and investments in the home country. On an aggregated level, households' financial behaviour determines national economy. It is, therefore, important to monitor attitudes, especially during periods of transition from one currency to a new one, as was the case in many countries of the European Union in the years before 2002.

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After the introduction of the euro as book money, in 1999, a majority of citizens of the European Union (EU) looked forward to the replacement of national currencies by the euro. Nevertheless, still one year before the conversion a considerable percentage was consistently opposing the euro (approximately one-third; Eurobarometer, Spring 2000).

Attitudes towards the euro and evaluation of currency conversion depend on perceived and expected economic developments within the EU (Müller-Peters et al., 2001). Attitudes are also depending on citizens' national identity and European identity. The conversion process provided a unique opportunity to study the importance of currencies as a symbol of national and supra-national identity. In this paper we argue that attitudes towards the new currency depend on national and supra-national identity. We replicate partly the EU-wide study by Müller-Peters et al. (2001), but use strictly defined constructs and go into more detail as far as the predictors of national and European identity are concerned.

Various studies show that before the introduction of the euro, being European was rarely mentioned when people were asked what constitutes their personal identity, whereas belonging to a nation was a significant characteristic of definitions of self (Breakwell, 1996; Chryschoou, 2000). Since a nation is a large scale category, people develop social representations of their nation (Breakwell, 1983) and conceive of the nation as an imagined community (Anderson, 1983). The higher the subjective congruence between self perception and social representations of the nation the more likely people feel close to their nation and show high identity (Hogg, 1992).

With the shift of national autonomy to a more global decision level, importance of the supra-national category, in the present case the EU, increases. EU fulfils prerequisite conditions for being a potent spender of supra-national identity, positive collective self-esteem, trust in economic prosperity, political stability and continuity (Breakwell, 1996). Citizens' formation of a supra-national identity (e.g., Ros et al., 1987; Salazar, 1998), a European identity, derives from being members of the EU. It may be facilitated by the conversion of national to a European currency and especially strengthened when the euro is visible. People believing in European economic and political welfare may perceive the euro as a symbol of Europe and may be in favour of the new currency, whereas citizens fearing loss of political and economic power of their nation and uncontrollable European developments are likely to disapprove European integration and the introduction of the euro.

Several authors (e.g., Bar-Tal, 1993; Kelman, 1969; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989; Mummendey and Simon, 1997) differentiate between patriotism and nationalism as two different types of national identity. Patriotism results from pure categorization and emotional attachment to one's own nation. Nationalism, on the other hand, bases on discrimination processes: while one's own nation is evaluated positively, other nations are devaluated.

Patriotism and nationalism base on different forms of social comparisons (Mummendey et al., 2001a; Mummendey and Simon, 1997). Patriotism results from comparisons within the nation. For instance, the perceived current quality of life, social norms, national values, etc. are compared to historical representations of the nation or to an imagined ideal nation. Nationalism, on the other hand, is constituted by social comparisons between nations. As people strive for positive distinctiveness of their own nation, they show tendencies to devalue achievements of other nations.

National and European identities are interdependent constructs since people belong to both entities, to their nation as subgroup and to Europe as the super-ordinate group. Follow-

ing self-categorization theory, higher identification with a subgroup leads to a decrease of identification with a vertically higher group (Turner, 1987). Brewer (1991) and Mummendey and Wenzel (1999), however, hypothesize that positive correlations between identification with a subgroup and with the super-ordinate group are also possible. Empirical studies about the relationship between identification with subgroups and identification with super-ordinate categories show inconsistent results. Summarizing results of studies conducted in a variety of contexts, Strack (2000) concludes that both positive and negative correlations are observable.

Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) explain the relationship between identification with the in-group and with a more inclusive super-ordinate group in their in-group projection model. Positive correlations occur if the in-group projects its own characteristics to the super-ordinate group; in this case the in-group seems to be prototypical for the super-ordinate group. The problem is that higher perceived prototypicality of the in-group fosters in-group bias towards other subgroups (out-groups), especially if the other groups are assessed as being different from the in-group. In contrast, the common in-group identity model (Gaertner et al., 1993) states that salience of a common in-group on a super-ordinate-level reduces out-group discrimination under conditions of contact.

How can competing theories account for the relationships between national identity and European identity as identification with a super-ordinate group? Relationships between national and European identities may depend on the different types of national identity (patriotism and nationalism). Following Mummendey's and Wenzel's (1999) argumentation, a positive correlation between national and European identities is supposed to be associated with nationalistic tendencies, because the national characteristics are generalized to the super-ordinate category, resulting in discrimination of other nations. However, we assume that the common in-group identity model can better account for the identity management processes involved in the European integration process. The common in-group identity model states that a stronger European identity goes along with patriotism because European identity reduces in-group bias between subgroups and facilitates inter-group contact for the following reasons: (1) Gaertner et al. (1999) state that equal status between groups requires cooperation between the groups in fulfilling common aims, and supportive norms of authorities must be present as prerequisite features for successful combination of groups; conditions which are incorporated in the contracts of the European Union. (2) Recent research emphasizes that dual identifications—with a subgroup and the super-ordinate group—offer the most positive condition for inter-group contact (Hornsey and Hogg, 1999). (3) Optimal Distinctiveness Theory by Brewer (1991) asserts that negative correlations between identification with a subgroup and a super-ordinate group base on the subjective threat of distinctiveness. Distinctiveness seems to be a strong motivator behind nationalism. And (4) even Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) assume that social discrimination as behavioural consequence is only observable if the subgroups are assessed as being different. In case of similar subgroups, in-group favouritism is more likely than social discrimination. In-group favouritism is more typical for patriotism than for nationalism. We, therefore, assume that patriotism is positively correlated to European identity, whereas nationalism is negatively linked to European identity.

Kelman (1969, p. 279) states that patriotism and nationalism depend on different types of "ties between individual members and the system [nation]", which are described as

instrumental and sentimental attachments. A instrumental attachment bases on subjective cost and benefit estimations of belonging to a nation. If benefits equal or exceed costs, people feel attached to their nation. Citizenship is assessed instrumentally, as a way to reach goals which are not accessible for a single individual. Instrumental attachment, therefore, bases mainly on rational considerations. A sentimental attachment is established whenever personal values are in accordance with national values. Sentimental attachment is emotional and mirrored in traditions, cultural achievements, and dedication to national symbols.

Instrumental and sentimental attachments are assumed to compensate each other. Kelman (1969) argues that ideally people show instrumental and sentimental attachment to a balanced extend. However, if one aspect is low or missing it may be compensated by the other type of attachment. If people are frustrated with regard to subjective benefits, they may find attachment to the nation in an up-grading of national, cultural symbols. In addition, instrumental attachment can compensate for missing congruence between personal and cultural values which are displayed by national symbols.

Instrumental attachment to one's own nation can likely lead to patriotism (Cinnirella, 1996; Kelman, 1969). In contrast to sentimental attachment, instrumental attachment is more reflective. Citizenship is assessed instrumentally as a way to achieve goals that are not accessible for a single individual. Attachment is only questioned if the state fails to provide instrumental ways in meeting personal needs and interests or if benefits involve high personal costs. As instrumental attachment bases on the nation's political stability and economic functioning, comparisons within the nation are activated which are characteristic for patriotism (Mummendey and Simon, 1997).

Sentimental attachment is assumed to back nationalism (Cinnirella, 1996; Kelman, 1969); it results in loyalty to national culture, traditions, and symbols. Evaluations of one's own nation's culture are highly emotional and likely to be biased by the aim to maintain a positive self-esteem. Nationalistic tendencies as devaluation of other nations' achievements are possible in order to achieve a higher evaluation of national achievements. If national symbols are questioned, a threat to sentimental attachment is almost automatically elicited and results in tendencies to maintain those national symbols and protect the nation from influences from outside; nationalism is then further strengthened.

National currencies may be part of instrumental or sentimental attachment to one's own nation because they may be assessed as an economic medium that facilitates national economy in an instrumental sense, or as a part of national culture and a national symbol in a sentimental way. In Austria, pride in the national currency goes along with pride in traditions and customs. The Austrian schilling is, therefore, perceived as a national symbol (Müller-Peters et al., 2001). We, therefore, assume that sentimental attachment will be threatened by the replacement of national currencies by the euro. Stronger nationalistic tendencies will result.

In sum, instrumental attachment to one's own nation is assumed to yield patriotism and patriotism allows for positive correlations between national and European identity. Sentimental attachment, on the other hand, is assumed to yield nationalism which enforces discrimination processes; the correlation between nationalism and European identity should be negative. Finally, high European identity should lead to acceptance of the euro.

Acceptance of the euro should also depend on expectations about economic developments within the EU. Optimism was studied predominantly as personal disposition basing on self-enhancing motives (e.g., Weinstein, 1980). Optimism describes generalized ex-




Fig. 1. Assumed relationships between assessed variables.

pectancies about the more likely occurrence of good than bad outcomes in one's own future (Carver and Scheier, 1998). Wengler and Svenson (1982) extended this assumption to optimistic expectations about general world events. This so-called general optimism (Wengler and Rosen, 2000, p. 719) is described as "generalized cognitive-social attitude to the state of the world" with no or little direct, individual control. As currency conversion is out of individual control, general optimism may also affect European identity. We assume that people holding positive expectations about general future developments will be more open-minded towards European integration processes, and will therefore show a higher degree of European identity than people with pessimistic expectations, and develop favourable attitudes towards the euro. A summary representation of assumptions is displayed in Fig. 1.

2. Method

2.1. Participants

A random sample of 318 Austrian citizens participated. People were contacted in December 1998 at their working places, in leisure clubs, etc. and invited to participate in the study by completing a questionnaire that took about 25 min.

Sex of participants was balanced (48.1% females and 51.9% males). Age of participants ranged from 17 to 70 years ($M = 41.83$ years; $S.D. = 14.95$). With regard to education, 14.5% had attended primary school, 43.8% had completed vocational school, 29.9% held a secondary school diploma, and 11.9% held a university degree. The average monthly net household income ranged from € 1100 to 1450. As for age and sex the sample was representative for Austria; as far as the level of formal education is concerned, participants with higher education were slightly over-represented.

3. Material

Participants completed a questionnaire on (a) attitudes towards the euro (7 items), (b) European identity (6 items), (c) patriotism (11 items), (d) nationalism (10 items), (e) instrumental (10 items), and (f) sentimental attachment towards Austria (11 items), and (g) general optimism (6 items). All answers were provided on Likert-type or bipolar scales with seven response categories, respectively.

Scales for measurement of attitudes towards the euro, European identity, patriotism and nationalism were partly adopted from the EU-wide study on the euro (Müller-Peters et al., 2001), where items measuring patriotism, nationalism and European identity¹ had been translated from Kosterman and Feshbach (1989). As the EU-wide study on the euro was limited in space due to the inclusion of several constructs (only three items per construct),

¹ Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) labelled European identity as "internationalism", Müller-Peters (1998) as "European patriotism". As this paper does not focus on European relations to other super-ordinate economic agents like United States of America or Asia, differentiation in European patriotism and European nationalism seems not to be important. We therefore choose the label European identity for the reason of simplicity.

we added some more items on European identity, patriotism and nationalism. Items measuring instrumental and sentimental attachment were constructed following Kelman's (1969) definition of both constructs. Items of the variable "general optimism" were constructed following Wengler and Rosen's (2000) definition of the construct and with a special focus on national events, which are out of individual control but in the scope of interest of participants. The complete questionnaire with reliabilities and average answers is given in the Appendix A.

4. Results

Since all scales in the questionnaire proved to be highly reliable, indices for the attitudes towards the euro, European identity, patriotism and nationalism, sentimental and instrumental attachment, and optimism were computed by averaging the respective items. Table 1 presents means, standard deviations, and correlations between the seven variables. Average attitude towards the euro amounts to $M = 4.49$ ($S.D. = 1.75$).

On average, frequencies of Euro supporters and opponents were in balance and participants showed medium attachment to Europe. Patriotism was highly supported and people were also highly sentimentally attached to Austria. Nationalism and instrumental attachment showed medium average scores. In addition, people had neither very optimistic nor pessimistic expectations about Austrian future developments. Age was correlated to patriotism, nationalism, instrumental and sentimental attachment positively and to general optimism inversely. It seems that older people have closer ties to the nation and are more pessimistic than younger ones. Women and men did not differ in any variable of interest. People with higher educational level reported a more positive attitude towards the euro, higher European identity, higher optimism, but less sentimental attachment to Austria and weaker tendencies to be nationalistic. Socio-demographic variables had effects on absolute levels of some variables. However, following theoretical framework we did not expect any interaction between socio-demographics and variables included in the structural model. Therefore, we did not include socio-demographics in the following path model.

Hypotheses were tested by structural analysis using path analyses (software package AMOS, version 3.61). The model depicted in Fig. 1 proved to be inadequate in describing the correlation matrix ($\chi^2(11) = 128.71$, $P < 0.01$; AGFI = 0.74, RMR = 0.21). Misfit of the empirical model was caused by neglected direct effects of nationalism and general optimism on the attitudes towards the euro, and by a strong negative effect of general optimism on nationalism.


A second analysis included these paths. Goodness of fit parameters were acceptable ($\chi^2(8) = 12.90$, $P = 0.12$; AGFI = 0.96, RMR = 0.05). Fig. 2 shows that European identity favours attitudes towards the euro, and is in turn positively affected by patriotism and negatively by nationalism. Beside their indirect effects via European identity, nationalism and general optimism prove to have direct effects on attitudes towards the euro. In contrast to our assumptions, nationalism and patriotism cannot simply be traced back to sentimental and instrumental attachment, respectively. Nationalism is only affected by sentimental attachment, whereas patriotism depends on sentimental and to a minor degree on instrumental attachment, respectively. Although the impact of instrumental attachment on

Table 1
Means, standard deviations, and correlations of assessed variables

| Variables | M | S.D. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|---------------------------|-------|-------|---------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|-------|------|----|
| Attitude towards the euro | 4.49 | 1.75 | - | | | | | | | | | |
| European identity | 4.96 | 1.22 | 0.51** | - | | | | | | | | |
| Patriotism | 5.63 | 0.98 | 0.26** | 0.26** | - | | | | | | | |
| Nationalism | 4.13 | 1.14 | -0.43** | -0.19** | 0.39** | - | | | | | | |
| Instrumental attachment | 4.66 | 0.99 | 0.26** | 0.31** | 0.42** | 0.04 | - | | | | | |
| Sentimental attachment | 5.63 | 0.95 | -0.04 | 0.19** | 0.76** | 0.49** | 0.37** | - | | | | |
| General optimism | 3.87 | 1.28 | 0.54** | 0.48** | 0.13 | -0.24** | 0.41** | 0.04 | - | | | |
| Age | 41.83 | 14.95 | -0.01 | 0.11* | 0.37** | 0.21** | 0.18** | 0.38** | -0.18** | - | | |
| Sex | | | 0.08 | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.16** | 0.10 | - | |
| Education | | | 0.28** | 0.21** | -0.09 | -0.39** | -0.02 | -0.18** | 0.16** | -0.03 | 0.01 | - |

Note: Variables range from 1 to 7, where higher values indicate agreement. Sex was coded '0' for females, '1' for males. Except for education (Spearman correlation), Pearson correlations were computed.

* $P < 0.05$.
** $P < 0.01$.



patriotism is only small, it makes an interesting difference to nationalism, which is not at all affected by instrumental attachment. In addition, general optimism affects nationalism in a negative way. In this model, attitudes towards the euro were explained to a degree of 46%.

5. Discussion

Attitudes towards the euro are closely linked to identification with EU. People who highly identify with Europe as the supra-national category are in favour of the euro, whereas people opposing the idea of a common Europe also oppose the euro as symbol of the EU. In accordance with Helleiner (1998), the euro seems not only to be perceived as new monetary unit which substitutes national currencies and facilitates economic transaction processes within the European Union. Instead, the euro may serve as a European (economic) symbol and a unifying medium on the way towards European integration. At the time of currency conversion, attitudes towards the euro were affected by identification with Europe. In future, when the euro has successfully been introduced in everyday affairs, it may be the other way round; rather than identity being a determinant of attitudes toward the euro, the euro may boost European identity.

European monetary union and EU comprise various member states. European identity depends partly on national identity. National identity was defined as nationalism and patriotism, which turned out to have different effects on European identity: nationalism obstructs identification with the supra-national entity, whereas patriotism facilitates European identity. Nationalism stands in contrast to a unified Europe, because people derive national identification from comparisons with other nations that often lead to discrimination, one's own nation favouring evaluations. As the nation is upgraded and/or other nations are devaluated, the unification with other devaluated nations means a threat to national identity. People, therefore, tend to keep distinctions between nations in order to dissociate a seemingly "better Austria" from other nations and to fix the biased view of one's own nation. Patriotism, on the other hand, means an emotional attachment to one's own nation, basing on pure categorization. As patriotism does not base on derogation of other nations, national identity is not threatened by the unification processes. Patriotism seems to provide a positive national self-esteem which supports people's willingness to look across the borders and to feel associated with the supra-nation.

Differentiation of national identity into patriotism and nationalism is strongly discussed in the scientific community (Hopkins, 2001; McGarty, 2001; Condor, 2001; Mummendey et al., 2001a). Theoretical, ideological and operational counter-arguments are mentioned. However, as Mummendey et al. (2001b) state in their rejoinder to sharp critique, patriotism and nationalism both mean identification with one's own nation, but have different effects on out-group evaluations: in the present study, out-group discrimination was only observable in the case of nationalistic attachment, whereas national identification in the type of patriotism was independent from out-group devaluation. For the different consequences regarding European integration it was useful to differentiate between patriotism and nationalism.

Nationalism did not only affect European identity, but showed also a direct effect on the attitudes people hold towards the euro. This direct effect may be explained by the fact, that national currencies serve the purpose of differentiation. Currency conversion to the euro

means giving-up the Austrian Shilling, which was a distinct Austrian (economic) symbol. People with nationalistic attitudes not only are against the euro as a European symbol, but mainly oppose it because it replaces the national currency.

In the present study, it was assumed that nationalism bases on sentimental attachment to Austria, whereas patriotism is supported by instrumental attachment. Empirical results show a more complex structure. It seems that sentimental attachment fosters both patriotism and nationalism. But in contrast to nationalism, patriotism is further affected by instrumental attachment. It seems that emotional attachment to national traditions, values and symbols is a characteristic of national identity, independent of the differentiation into nationalism and patriotism. Only instrumental attachment differentiates between patriotism and nationalism. Patriotism not only is characterized by a more rational consideration of personal costs and benefits derived from citizenship but is also related to emotional attachment to one's own nation.

It was further assumed that instrumental and sentimental attachment to one's own nation may compensate for each other. Results showed a positive correlation that, at first glance, is contradictory. Kelman (1969) states that compensation is probable if one aspect is low or missing. In Austria, both types of attachment were rather high. In part, the positive correlation between sentimental and instrumental attachment may be due to ceiling effects. General optimism turned out to be a important predictor of European identity and attitudes towards the euro. People holding optimistic expectations also feel close to EU and support the euro as single European currency. As European integration processes and European monetary Union are future projects and involve changes in everyday actions, it makes sense that attitudes are affected by general optimism as an indicator of the acceptance of change.

General optimism is indirectly related to nationalism. It seems that people holding pessimistic expectations about future development tend to keep Austria distinct from other nations and international competition. If the future is not seen rosy, it seems to be wise to "close the borders" and to dissociate from other nations, believing that Austria will better cope with economic issues as a single nation than as a small member of a large union. From this perspective, nationalism can also be interpreted as a wish to keep the actual situation stable and unchanged. The negative effect from general optimism on nationalism may offer interesting interpretations about the instrumentality of nationalism and the motives which activate out-group derogation. However, results were achieved in an exploratory step of statistical procedure and therefore have to be interpreted with caution. More stability to the modified path model would be attached by a separate test with a new sample.

The theoretical model was tested with a Austrian sample which poses the question whether results may be replicated in other nations. Some conclusions seem to be independent from national characteristics, some may only be interpreted in the Austrian context. At least three conclusions may be drawn independently from Austria as a nation: (1) The euro seems to be a strong symbol of the European Union and may not be assessed neglecting the attitudes people have towards the European Union. (2) National identity in the form of nationalism opposes the idea of an united Europe and stands in contrast to European identity. Patriotism seems to allow for dual identities. Following Breakwell (1996), people have concerns that the European Union will reduce national characteristics and therefore threatens national identities. It seems that the European integration will more likely succeed if it concedes to people's wishes to maintain distinct national characters and supports dual identity management. (3)

Optimistic expectations about future developments seem to facilitate changes and developments on the European level and show a strong correlation to people's instrumental attachment to their nations. If people are satisfied with national achievements and functioning of institutions, optimistic expectations about national future developments seem to be fostered. Some conclusion should be restricted to nations similar to Austria or should be transferred to other nations only with caution. Austria is a small, wealthy country in the middle of Europe. The national currency was strictly bound to the German Mark and due to its stability, the Austrian Schilling stood for economic success and was loaded with highly emotional meanings (Feymann, 1997). The Austrian Schilling was a national symbol and an indicator of people's sentimental attachment to Austria. In nations with former unstable national currencies, introduction of the euro might not be as strongly related to aspects of national identity like in Austria. Furthermore, characteristics of sentimental and/or instrumental attachments might be different in other nations.

In conclusion, attitudes towards the euro are shown to be strongly linked to identification processes on national and European levels. The euro serves as a European symbol and is, therefore, linked to the degree of European identity, which in turn is related to national identity, to patriotism, and nationalism.

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Appendix A. Questionnaire

| Scale/items (seven response options) | Cronbach alpha | M | S.D. |
|--|----------------|------|------|
| Attitudes towards the euro (Müller-Peters et al., 2001) | 0.94 | | |
| The euro is reasonable vs. unreasonable. ^a | | 2.84 | 2.08 |
| The euro is bad vs. good. | | 4.96 | 2.03 |
| The euro is insecure vs. secure. | | 4.38 | 2.07 |
| The euro is controllable vs. uncontrollable. ^a | | 3.58 | 1.98 |
| When thinking about the euro I feel calm vs. worried. ^a | | 4.14 | 2.17 |
| When thinking about the euro I feel tense vs. relaxed. | | 4.28 | 2.08 |
| Are you for or against the EU having one European currency in all member states, including Austria? That is, replacing the Austrian Schilling by the euro? | | 4.56 | 1.82 |
| European identity | 0.90 | | |
| I feel as an European. | | 5.32 | 1.46 |
| I feel connected to Europe and its citizens. | | 4.85 | 1.44 |
| To be an European means more than being member of the European Union. | | 4.90 | 1.43 |

Appendix A. (Continued)

| Scale/items (seven response options) | Cronbach alpha | M | S.D. |
|--|----------------|------|------|
| It means nothing to me to be an European. ^a | | 3.07 | 1.67 |
| I identify with Europe. | | 4.73 | 1.50 |
| I feel as belonging to the Europeans. | | 5.03 | 1.40 |
| Patriotism | 0.91 | | |
| I feel as an Austrian. | | 6.16 | 1.22 |
| I feel connected to other Austrians. | | 5.48 | 1.28 |
| I am a typical Austrian. | | 5.11 | 1.75 |
| I have no similarity to other Austrians. ^a | | 3.22 | 1.58 |
| I identify with Austria. | | 5.52 | 1.41 |
| To be an Austrian means more than having the Austrian citizenship. | | 5.82 | 1.28 |
| I feel attached to Austria. | | 5.83 | 1.15 |
| It means little to me to be an Austrian. ^a | | 2.15 | 1.35 |
| Austria is very important to me. | | 5.68 | 1.32 |
| I see myself as an Austrian. | | 6.19 | 1.06 |
| I hardly feel attached to the Austrians. ^a | | 2.52 | 1.47 |
| Nationalism | 0.88 | | |
| It is important that Austria differentiates itself from other countries. | | 5.38 | 1.46 |
| It is very good for Austria to be open to other cultures. ^a | | 5.58 | 1.46 |
| Austria is a better country than most others. | | 5.09 | 1.57 |
| Austrians are superior in many respects to people of other nationalities. | | 4.02 | 1.64 |
| Austria should try to stay out of other countries' influence. | | 4.03 | 1.73 |
| It would be good if Austria differentiated itself more from other countries. | | 4.41 | 1.64 |
| Only people of Austrian descent should possess the Austrian citizenship. | | 3.61 | 2.14 |
| It is justified for Austria to be better off than other countries. | | 4.72 | 1.65 |
| Austria should distance itself more from other countries. | | 3.56 | 1.67 |
| Austrians show more initiative than citizens of other countries. | | 4.05 | 1.54 |
| Instrumental attachment | 0.86 | | |
| Austria has a very good social security system. | | 5.67 | 1.22 |
| I value Austria's economic achievements. | | 4.77 | 1.43 |

Appendix A. (Continued)

| Scale/items (seven response options) | Cronbach alpha | M | S.D. |
|--|----------------|------|------|
| Austria's security in the future will be worse vs. better. | | 3.73 | 1.59 |
| Austria's political position in the future will be worse vs. better. | | 3.79 | 1.54 |
| In the future, Austrian culture will be worse vs. better. | | 4.35 | 1.34 |
| The quality of life in the future in Austria will be worse vs. better. | | 3.63 | 1.58 |

^a Items were recoded before building a scale index. Higher values mean a positive attitude towards the euro and agreement to the rating scales. Items were presented in German language. For the original wording please contact the authors.

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Appendix A. (Continued)

| Scale/items (seven response options) | Cronbach alpha | M | S.D. |
|--|----------------|------|------|
| The Austrian state offers a lot for the taxes Austrians pay. | | 3.89 | 1.48 |
| I am pleased with the Austrian political system. | | 3.80 | 1.66 |
| The Austrian government system functions very well. | | 4.34 | 1.49 |
| I value the social benefits the Austrian system has to offer. | | 5.35 | 1.36 |
| I am pleased with the way Austrian democracy works. | | 4.66 | 1.48 |
| I value Austria's technological and scientific achievements. | | 5.12 | 1.38 |
| It is a pity that the Austrian state offers so little to individual citizens. ^a | | 3.61 | 1.70 |
| I value Austria's welfare and social security system. | | 4.63 | 1.42 |
| Sentimental attachment | 0.89 | 5.39 | 1.59 |
| I am pleased when I see the Austrian red-white-red national flag. | | 5.26 | 1.72 |
| I like Austrian national costumes. | | 5.92 | 1.14 |
| Austrian national heritage should be passed on to future generations because it reflects national culture. | | 2.52 | 1.40 |
| I am indifferent to Austrian customs and traditions. ^a | | 6.08 | 1.07 |
| I value Austrian cuisine. | | 5.63 | 1.57 |
| I am pleased when I hear the Danube Waltz at New Year's Day. | | 5.35 | 1.27 |
| I feel embedded within the Austrian culture. | | 5.27 | 1.38 |
| Austrian customs and traditions mean a lot to me. | | 6.20 | 1.01 |
| The beauty of the Austrian mountains means a lot to me. | | 5.67 | 1.20 |
| Classical music as part of the Austrian culture should be treasured and carried on. | | | |
| General optimism | 0.90 | 3.85 | 1.61 |
| In the future, Austria will be generally doing worse vs. better. | | 3.87 | 1.63 |
| In the future, Austrian economy will be doing worse vs. better. | | | |

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An evaluation in the choice of inputs and outputs in the efficiency measurement of police forces

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Abstract

The new Labour government has recently instigated an initiative to establish whether English and Welsh police forces should be ranked into groups based on an efficiency measure. A particular problem, however, is that policing includes many inputs and outputs (outcomes) that could potentially be utilised in efficiency models. This paper considers the problems associated with measuring relative police force efficiency given that a vast number of potential indicators (inputs and outputs) must be reduced to a handful to allow feasible estimation. In addition, it discusses the input and output variables utilised in the first 'official' analysis of English and Welsh police force efficiency [Demonstration Project, Home Office, London, UK, 2001].

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1. Introduction

The recent programme of efficiency analysis of English and Welsh police forces, instigated by the new Labour government, has been analysed and discussed by the Home Office, H.M. Treasury and consultative teams since 1999. This programme began when the new Labour government commissioned a study to determine the viability of ranking police forces into efficiency groups, and hence allow differential funding based on these

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