

thereby augmenting a trend already inherent in Judeo-Christian culture (Laslett, 1972; cited in Vergin, 1985), leads to the formation of what is known today as the nuclear family, consisting of a married couple and their offspring (cf. Boulding, 1976; Cherlin, 1983; Eckert, 1979; Mitterauer & Sieder, 1977; Seward, 1970; Shorter, 1977). In past centuries, especially in the rural areas of Europe, a type of family characterized by a strict segregation of roles between men and women had been dominant. In industrialized societies, largely due to the demands of capitalist economy for a flexibly disposable labor force that included women, role-segregation is no longer functional. Thus, a change has come about from "gender-roles" in preindustrial societies to "sex-roles" in industrialized nations (Illich, 1983). A society having a "vernacular gender-role structure" is characterized by a strict distinction of places, times, tools, duties, etc. for men and women respectively (see Bourdieu, 1972, for an anthropological example of gender-role specific domains in houses). Families in such societies can be conceived of as having a dualistic social structure, where men and women live in complementary worlds and perform complementary tasks. On the other hand, societies with a sex-role structure are ideally characterized by a competitive duality within which economic, political, legal, and social equality between men and women can purportedly be realized (Illich, 1983, p. 19). Indeed, egalitarianism is a positively valued norm within Western societies. It is also true, however, that Western society still has a long way to go in order to realize this ideal, as the proponents of the feminist movement continue to emphasize. On the other hand, anthropological research about household structure and division of labor in preindustrial societies has demonstrated the existence of segregated gender-roles in many ethnic units (Atkinson, 1982; Quinn, 1977; for an elaborated theory see Sanday, 1981).

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The experience of purchasing conflict between spouses was tested in four cultures: Austria, India, Turkey, and the USA. Spouses had to complete an interdependence matrix-type questionnaire, assessing their well-being in situations of conflict and agreement. Differences between well-being scores in situations of conflict and agreement were interpreted as reflecting the degree of spouses' interdependence. It was found that spouses in Western countries depend on each other more in personal decisions than do spouses in more traditional, non-Western countries. Specifically, spouses from traditionally patriarchal families in India and Turkey depended least upon each other. This was expected, due to culturally and historically prescribed differences in the degree of role segregation between spouses. The stronger the role-segregation in traditional societies, the less spouses depend upon each other in personal matters. It was also found that husbands are more autonomous in their decisions than wives, specifically in male-dominated Western families. Male dominance in Western families appears to be based on different mechanisms than patriarchy in traditional non-Western marriages.

## MALE DOMINANCE, ROLE SEGREGATION, AND SPOUSES' INTERDEPENDENCE IN CONFLICT A Cross-Cultural Study

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**Studies of the history of families in Western Europe have consistently shown that industrialization, paralleled by urbanization and**

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Since roles both prescribe and restrict the execution of power with regard to places, times, and fields of activity, the legitimate power of one partner in one field at a given place and time is complemented by the other partner's legitimate power in another field at another place and time. Generally, it may appear that one person's dominance corresponds to the other's dependence. In a cross-cultural perspective, however, male dominance in the family seems to be compatible with both high mutual interdependence, as well as a high degree of autonomy for both spouses, depending on the traditional pattern of role-segregation versus role-integration. We propose to illustrate this state of affairs by contrasting family samples from four nations — two Western and industrialized nations, Austria and the United States, and two more traditional and developing nations, India and Turkey.<sup>1</sup>

#### FAMILIES IN AUSTRIA AND THE USA

Unlike its rural predecessors, the modern Western family is characterized by the growing role of sentiment in the relations between husbands and wives (Shorter, 1977). This leads to a high degree of mutual emotional interdependence within the contemporary couple (Berg & Clark, 1986; Levinger, 1983). Emotional interdependence, however, does not automatically entail egalitarian power relations, and the husband, as a "member of the class of men" still dominates the household in the large majority of families (Gillespie, 1971; Staines, 1986). This pattern of male dominance is only modified by the amount of resource contributions each spouse adds to family living, giving spouses some degree of freedom to negotiate power according to equity principles (Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Heer, 1963).

Wives in relatively traditional Western families are expected to concentrate on domestic activities and husbands are expected to be in charge of extrafamilial matters, such as occupation, thereby justifying their dominant role.

Shifts towards equality and a more symmetrical power distribution augment marital interdependence. This situation produces a

concordance in sexual and emotional realms (Thoré, 1970; cited in Shorter, 1977, p. 84, 326). Arrangements within the household, which were once silently accepted, are now questioned. Spouses with integrated roles seek to decide jointly about family matters, which entails higher degrees of interaction and perceived mutual influence (Bernard, 1981; Qualls, 1982).

Families in Austria and the USA can therefore be considered as highly interdependent on an emotional level; they exhibit a variety of dominance patterns, from patriarchal to somewhat egalitarian.

#### FAMILIES IN INDIA AND TURKEY

Whereas the nuclear family in Western societies has developed during the last 100 to 200 years, the development of the nuclear family in the urban centers of developing countries is much more recent.

In India, the current situation of the Hindu family in the cities is characterized by rapid change. In the traditional Hindu society, marriage was considered a social duty and not a means for attaining individual fulfillment and happiness by joining a loved person. This cultural "habitus" (Bourdieu, 1980) found its expression in marriages being arranged by the parents of the prospective spouses (Kapadia, 1980). Another consequence regarding the spouses' role-set was "clear cut division of labor between them, each having an essential role to play in the household; and the expected subordinate position of the wife" (Ross, 1961; cited in Kapur, 1972, p. 11). The traditional Hindu joint family is an example of a clear-cut gender-role segregation between husband and wife, with the roles being complementary and "so markedly specified as not to permit any conflict to arise" (Kapur, 1972, p. 9).

In the course of modernization, the traditional Hindu joint family in the urban centers changed to the now predominant nuclear family (Narain, 1970). This process of social structural change also implied a psychological situation "in which the tradition is undergoing continuous change but the modern has not been accepted fully" (Kapur, 1972, p. 12). In an extensive case study, Kapur (1972)

locates many working-wife families where, in the majority of the cases, marital maladjustment resulted from the clash between the demands of the wife's new occupational role and her traditionally assigned role as a housewife and mother. Interestingly, high marital satisfaction was found primarily in patriarchal families where the working woman adhered to her traditional role assignment, whereas in U.S. families, highest marriage satisfaction occurred in egalitarian couples (Gray-Little & Burks, 1983). In modern Indian families one can observe a continuity of role-segregation, even though it is declining (Sinha, 1970), with the wife typically in an inferior position relative to her husband (Narain, 1970).

The Islamic society of Turkey, principally since the days of Kemal Atatürk, has been undergoing rapid change through the pressures of Westernization and industrialization. Naturally, this process has changed family structure, extended family relations, and intrafamily life to a considerable degree (Vergin, 1985). In the industrializing urban centers, the extended family has given way to smaller family units. This has been largely due to the "gecekondu," the migration movement from rural areas to the cities, whereby the migrating family has been forced to leave behind the network of its relatives (Karpas, 1976). Despite those rapid and considerable changes in family structure, however, "the husband has maintained his authority and . . . the Turkish family as a whole has retained its authoritarian patriarchal character" (Kiray, 1976). This patriarchy goes hand in hand with a marked role-segregation of male and female activities in the family. Here, role segregation means juxtaposed spheres of influence of the spouses with little overlap, which implies a relative autonomy for spouses' actions within their assigned spheres (Olson, 1982; Vergin, 1985).

Primarily in the urban centers, there exists what Rodman (1972) has called the "modified patriarchal" society, with "paternal authority . . . inversely correlated with social class" (Fox, 1973). Turkey is thus another example that resource theory does not apply directly to more traditional non-Western nations (see Buric & Zecovic, 1967; Safilios-Rothschild, 1967).

#### HYPOTHESES

Urban nuclear families in countries like India and Turkey are characterized by a much more pronounced patriarchal tradition, with the husband the dominant role. Role relations between husbands and wives in those countries are more segregated than in Western families; they preserve a flavor of gender-role structure with a more pronounced segregation of spheres of influence between husbands' and wives' family roles, thus exhibiting the structure of a bifocal family (Olson, 1982). As a consequence, personal decisions within the sphere of the spouses' interests will be made more autonomously than similar decisions in Western families. This creates a seemingly paradoxical picture: We hypothesize that, because of role-segregation, the spouses in the more patriarchal families of India and Turkey will be more autonomous in personal decisions than spouses in the less traditional societies of Austria and the USA, which are governed by the more egalitarian ideals of male-female relationships with their tendency to integrate and blur role assignments in marriage.

However, the pressures of Westernization on economic, political, and societal levels have created a life-style and a type of family that no longer clearly reflect the traditional patriarchal structures and gender-role segregation. Together with a tendency in urban centers to not rely on marriages arranged by the parents, the marital relationship of Indian men and women, for instance, also tends to replicate the surge of sentiment in the relationship between husband and wife (Goode, 1963; cited in Narain, 1970), which is reflected in preference for love marriages in Western societies (Shorter, 1970). We therefore expect that couples from India and Turkey who describe themselves as more egalitarian than the norm would exhibit less autonomy in personal decisions, thereby more closely resembling the Western type of family. Additionally, we expect men to be more autonomous than women, especially in patriarchal families, with this effect being more pronounced in Western samples than in samples from non-Western countries, because role-segregation promotes independence.

## METHOD<sup>2</sup>

### OVERVIEW AND RATIONALE OF THE EXPERIMENT

The present study was designed as a simulation experiment, where each spouse had to imagine desiring a product that would be of value only for him or her.<sup>3</sup> Then the subjects had to visualize four situations, where one spouse either buys the desired product with his or her partner's consent or against his or her spouse's will, or he or she does not buy the product because of their spouse's opposition. These situations had to be imagined twice, one time the subject himself or herself being the purchaser, the other time the subject being the consenting or dissenting partner. For each of the situations the subjects had to indicate how they would feel.<sup>4</sup>

### SUBJECTS

Families in each of the four countries were approached and asked to participate in the study. The number of families finally included in the investigation were: 44 in Linz, Austria, 38 in Patna, India, 33 in Istanbul, Turkey, and 37 in Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, USA, yielding a total of 304 subjects.

### MATERIAL

Wives and husbands were presented with questionnaires which assessed the following socio-economic variables: (1) Age, (2) years married, (3) number of children, (4) level of education, (5) having a paid occupation, (6) income. Marital satisfaction was measured on a verbally anchored seven-point scale ("very unsatisfying" to "very satisfying"), and marital dominance was measured by asking "Who is the boss in your marriage?" on a five-point scale ranging from "nearly always my partner" to "nearly always myself."

Next, the subjects had to fill out two parts of a questionnaire, each consisting of four questions. In part one, the subject had to imagine wanting to buy a desirable product which was useful only for him or her. The subject was to imagine a product, which was




Figure 1: Schematic Representation of Imagined Interaction Situations

not so cheap as not to deserve discussion with the partner nor so expensive as to burden the family budget.

The following text specified four situations. The subject buying or not buying the commodity was juxtaposed with the partner agreeing or disagreeing with the purchase. An overview is presented in Figure 1.

The second part of the questionnaire was worded passively, with the subject agreeing or opposing a purchase intention of his or her spouse, which then was either realized or not. Each of the situation descriptions was followed by a 7-point scale of well-being ("very bad" to "very good").

The original version of the questionnaire was in German. It was translated into the respective national languages and back-translated by native speakers proficient in German to ensure content equivalence.

### PROCEDURE

The instructions informed the subjects that the data were to be used for a scientific investigation only. To guarantee complete

sex-role segregation/integration. We juxtaposed two countries which exhibit more traditional segregation patterns, India and Turkey, with two countries with a more "modern" sex-role integration pattern, Austria and the USA. Obviously, we could have based our analysis on only two countries. In such a case the probability of obtaining the expected pattern solely by chance would have been  $p = .25$ . Using a total of four countries — countries pertaining to four different cultural-religious regions — we reduced chance probability to a lower  $p = 1/16 = .0625$ . This, we think, enables us to accept our samples as a reasonably rigorous base for drawing conclusion.<sup>5</sup>

#### DEPENDENCE ON THE OTHER'S AGREEMENT

The well-being scores from the 8 situation descriptions were standardized within each subject. We thereby hoped to reduce the effect of language use that might bias rating scale scores. Additionally, we used difference scores as dependent variables, thereby comparing intra-cultural interaction of variables between the different cultures, as suggested by the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition (1979, p. 154), for cross-cultural comparisons, and not the absolute scores.

Dependence on the partner's consent in performing one's own actions (i.e., purchasing) was calculated as the difference between standardized well-being scores in Situation 1 (accord by agreement) and 3 (conflict) for the active (purchasing) spouse (see Figure 1). The greater this difference, the more the subject's well-being depends upon his or her partner's agreement and the less he or she will risk conflict.<sup>6</sup>

A  $4 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2$  ANOVA (country  $\times$  male dominance vs. egalitarian  $\times$  low vs. high marriage satisfaction  $\times$  wife vs. husband, within units) was performed on the data with the couple as the unit of analysis. Because of different numbers of cases within the countries, and also because of the dichotomization of two independent variables, the design was neither balanced, nor, because of that, orthogonal. Therefore, unweighted cell means, as well as unique sums of squares, were used in the analysis.

anonymity, no names appeared on the form. The interviewers explained the situation descriptions and assured that both partners were filling out the questionnaires at the same time, but in different rooms to avoid verbal and nonverbal interaction. After completion of the questionnaires the subjects were debriefed.

## RESULTS

### INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

*Dominance* ratings were correlated positively between wives and husbands in each of the countries ( $R$  [Austria] = .69,  $R$  [USA] = .60,  $R$  [India] = .71,  $R$  [Turkey] = .79), all  $R$ s being highly significant. The male-dominance score within the family was derived by averaging each couple's ratings. As expected, the average male-dominance scores differed significantly between Austria ( $M = 3.29$ ) and the USA ( $M = 3.49$ ) on the one hand, and India ( $M = 3.79$ ) and Turkey ( $M = 4.27$ ) on the other hand (Contrast  $t(125) = 2.97, p < .005$ , separate  $s^2$  estimate).

*Marriage satisfaction* scores of wives and husbands were correlated positively in each country ( $R$  [Austria] = .22,  $p < .10$ ;  $R$  [USA] = .31,  $p < .05$ ;  $R$  [India] = .60,  $p < .001$ ;  $R$  [Turkey] = .19, *n.s.*). Such low correlations between husbands' and wives' satisfaction ratings are a rather common phenomenon, and are probably due to men's greater social desirability tendencies. We therefore calculated the intrafamilial score by taking the minimum of the two scores within each couple, in order to counter such biases. The average marriage satisfaction scores did not differ significantly between the countries.

For purposes of the ANOVA, both male-dominance and marriage satisfaction scores were dichotomized at the median separately within each country.

The third independent variable, *role-segregation*, was realized by selecting appropriate countries, which, according to sociological and ethnological research, tended more to one or the other pole of

TABLE 1  
Mean Dependence of Spouses by Country and Male Dominance

	Austria	USA	India	Turkey	Mean
Male-dominated	1.64	1.89	.99	.92	1.36
Egalitarian	1.55	1.98	1.34	1.75	1.65
Mean	1.60	1.94	1.17	1.33	

NOTE: Scores are differences between standardized well-being scores in situations 1 and 3. The higher the score, the more the spouses depend on the agreement of their partners in buying.

As hypothesized, there was a significant country by dominance interaction ( $F[3, 136] = 2.71, p < .05$ ). Data are presented in Table 1.

As can be seen, dependence is lowest in male-dominated Indian and Turkish families, with the relatively egalitarian families in those countries being very close to the dependence scores of Austrian and US families. A  $2 \times 2 \times 2$  ANOVA, identical to the above design, but collapsing the two Western and the two non-Western countries, yielded an even stronger effect ( $F[1, 144] = 7.09, p < .01$ ).

The Indian sample revealed the least degree of interdependence between spouses. This finding is related to the fact that the sample from Patna, the capital of Bihar, clearly represents the most traditional sample in the study. It should, therefore exhibit the most pronounced degree of traditional role-segregation.

Our hypothesis that men will be more autonomous than women, particularly in male-dominated Western families, was confirmed. There was significant male dominance by wife versus husband interaction ( $F[1, 136] = 4.44, p < .05$ ). It appears that husbands depend less upon their partner in male-dominated families ( $M = 1.13$ ) than either wives in male-dominated families ( $M = 1.59$ ) or both wives and husbands in egalitarian families ( $M_s = 1.64$  vs. 1.66). A closer inspection of the dependence patterns for each class of countries separately reveals that the reported male dominance

by wife versus husband interaction is due completely to the Western sample (Western countries only:  $F[1, 79] = 3.94, p < .05$ ) with husbands in male-dominated families depending much less ( $M = 1.44$ ) than wives ( $M = 2.07$ ) upon their spouses, while husbands and wives in egalitarian families do not differ ( $M_s = 1.64$  vs. 1.78). This finding replicates what has already been found for Austrian couples (Wagner, Kirchner, & Brandstätter, 1984). No such interaction appears for the combined Indian and Turkish sample. Here, however, the average dependence score for both spouses alike is significantly lower in male-dominated families ( $M = 1.02$ ) than in egalitarian families ( $M = 1.51$ ;  $F[1, 69] = 5.93, p < .02$ ).

The significant main effects of country ( $F[3, 136] = 6.18, p < .001$ ), male-dominated versus egalitarian couples ( $F[1, 136] = 5.10, p < .02$ ), and wife versus husband ( $F[1, 136] = 3.83, p < .05$ ) can only be interpreted in relation to respective interactions presented before.

The significant main effect for marriage satisfaction ( $F[1, 136] = 6.25, p < .01$ ) replicates the finding that spouses in unsatisfying relationships depend less upon each other ( $M = 1.35$ ) than spouses in satisfying marriages ( $M = 1.67$ ) and provides a plausibility test for the validity of the dependent variable (see Kirchner & Wagner, 1987).

#### DEGREE OF BEING AFFECTED BY PARTNER'S DISOBEDIENCE

This variable was measured with the well-being scores of the passive (agreeing vs. disagreeing) subject. The variable was calculated as difference between scores in Situations 4 (concord by obedience) and 3 (conflict) (see Figure 1).

A  $4 \times 2 \times 2$  ANOVA, identical to the design mentioned before, was applied to the data. There was a significant dominance main effect ( $F[1, 135] = 5.05, p < .02$ ), with spouses in male-dominated families being more affected by their partners' disobedience ( $M = 1.29$ ) than spouses in more egalitarian families ( $M = .96$ ). The significant wife versus husband main effect ( $F[1, 135] = 6.14, p < .01$ ) indicates that husbands generally are more affected by their

Thibaut, 1978, p. 118ff). This index resembles the Pearson product-moment correlation between the three pairs of well-being scores of the spouses in Situations 1, 3, and 4:

$$IC = (var[sums] - var[diffs]) / (var[sums] + var[diffs]).$$

*IC* varies between  $-1$  and  $+1$ , with positive scores indicating high correspondence of situational appraisal and negative scores indicating conflicting appraisal, such that where one partner feels well in a given situation, the other feels bad and vice versa. Again, the same  $4 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2$  ANOVA design as before was used. As expected, there was a significant country main-effect ( $F [3,136] = 5.16, p < .002$ ). Appraisals of situations between spouses corresponded more in Austria ( $M = .56$ ) and the USA ( $M = .65$ ) than they did in India ( $M = .28$ ) and Turkey ( $M = .45$ ). The respective contrast, collapsing Austria and the USA, as well as India and Turkey, was highly significant ( $F [1,144] = 12.36, p < .001$ ). This can be taken to indicate that increasing sex-role integration entails emotional and perceptual parallelism of spouses.

## DISCUSSION

It was found that spouses in industrialized countries depend more on their partners in conflict situations than spouses in patriarchal countries with a traditional role-segregation. As expected, this effect holds for traditional patriarchal families only. If the relationship is defined as more egalitarian by the spouses, no difference in dependence arises. Assuming that egalitarian families in traditional patriarchal societies such as India and Turkey have largely assimilated the norms of industrialized countries, this result is completely in line with Rodman's theory (1967), and, with the results of prior findings suggesting that sex-role "modern" partners report high degrees of mutual influence, less autonomous and more joint husband-wife decision making (Green et al., 1983; Qualls, 1982). The active (i.e., purchasing) spouse's well-being (and generally his or her behavior) is significantly affected by the partner's agreement or disagreement.

wives' disobedience ( $M = 1.32$ ) than wives are by their husbands' lack of obedience ( $M = .95$ ). Again these effects are nearly entirely due to the Western sample (Western sample only: male-dominance main effect  $F [1,78] = 3.32, p = .07$ ; wife vs. husband main effect  $F [1,78] = 5.28, p = .02$ ). Husbands in male-dominated families are affected most by their wives' disobedience ( $M = 1.62$ ) and wives in egalitarian families least ( $M = .90$ ), with men in egalitarian ( $M = 1.23$ ) and women in male dominated families ( $M = 1.14$ ) taking intermediate values. No comparable effects appeared for the Indian and Turkish sample.

Generally, we would have expected a negative correlation between our measures of dependence and degree of being affected by the partner's disobedience, such that subjects high on dependence would be less affected and vice versa. This general correlation, however, was not found ( $R$  [husbands] =  $-.08, R$  [wives] =  $.01$ ).

Post hoc considerations<sup>7</sup> led us to assume that the hypothesized correlation between dependence and degree of being affected by partner's disobedience should hold true only for male-dominated Western families, husbands and wives alike. This is what we found. The less a dominant husband in Western society depends on his spouse in his own decisions, the more he will be affected, if his wife disregards his objections, implying a negative correlation ( $R = -.35, N = 49, p < .01$ ). The same pattern applies to his wife: The more she depends on her husband, the less she should be affected by his decisions, implying a negative correlation too ( $R = -.26, N = 49, p < .05$ ). The respective correlations for more egalitarian Western families are virtually zero. Indian and Turkish families show no such clear correlations (patriarchal families:  $R$  [husbands] =  $-.27, N = 36, p = .05; R$  [wives] =  $.06, n.s.$ ; egalitarian:  $R$  [husbands] =  $.33, N = 35, p < .05; R$  [wives] =  $-.08, n.s.$ ).

## CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SPOUSES' WELL-BEING SCORES

In order to assess relative autonomy versus correspondence of situation appraisal within the couple, an index of correspondence (IC) between well-being scores of the spouses was used (Kelley &

In order to look at the formal and affective bases of power in the families, we correlated our dependent measures post hoc with the variable "Who is the boss in the family?". The correlations were generally weak, but if there was a positive relationship between variables, it appeared with the dependent variable dependence for Western spouses only (male-dominated wives  $R = .24^*$ ; egalitarian wives  $R = .22$ ; dominant husbands  $R = .21$ ; egalitarian husbands  $R = .43^{**}$ ). Obviously, the degree of perceived male dominance has direct consequences for spouses' autonomy versus dependence in everyday decisions for Western families in general, including the more egalitarian ones. Patriarchal dominance in non-Western families, on the other hand, seems to be a much more fundamental formal aspect of family life that goes unquestioned, but with relatively few immediate consequences for everyday decisions.

A second series of correlations, between our dependent measures and marital satisfaction as indicated by each spouse separately, yielded no relevant correlations for male-dominated families in general, but only for husbands in egalitarian families (dependence with marital satisfaction: Western husbands  $R = .01$ ; non-Western husbands  $R = .42^{**}$ ; degree of being affected by wife's disobedience with marital satisfaction: Western husbands  $R = -.25$ ; non-Western husbands  $R = .30^*$ ). These correlations indicate that non-Western husbands are more concerned with taking their wife's opinion into account when buying (dependence) the more they are satisfied with their marriage. Also, they are the more perplexed by their wives acting against their will (degree of being affected), the more they consider their marriage as satisfying. No such correlations were significant with Western husbands. It seems as if non-Western husbands in more egalitarian families base their appraisal of situations of conflict, agreement, and obedience more on affective aspects of their marriage and less on their mutually acknowledged dominance, as do Western husbands. So Gillespie's (1971) question, "Who has the power?", may be specifically relevant for egalitarian Western families.

We do not maintain that relative spousal independence in personal purchasing decisions implies that spouses do not place a high value on consensual decisions, or that they feel good about being in conflict with their partner. This would be absurd, especially for the collectivist Indian society, but also for Turkish couples. Our measures of dependence were difference measures calculated within the subject. Thus, they do not reflect the absolute level of spouses' well-being. The cross-cultural character of the study, involving translations of the questionnaire into four different languages, prohibited comparison of absolute scores.

Western male-dominated families show a prominently high dependence for wives, with husbands depending much less. Such a pattern did not turn up for more egalitarian Western or Indian and Turkish families. This result has also been found in other Austrian data. Wagner et al. (1984) report that, especially for male dominated families, the utility of a desired product outweighs the perceived social costs of conflict more for husbands than for wives. In other words, the husband's well-being depends less on the wife's will than vice versa. In a subsequent study, this effect was found to be modified by marital harmony. The imbalance of spousal dependence favoring the husband was found only in harmonious relationships, whereas in patriarchal disharmonious marriages both spouses decided autonomously (Brandstätter, Kirchner, & Wagner, 1987).

Also, with regard to the variable "degree of being affected by spouse's disobedience," Western male-dominated families take an exceptional position. Husbands in such families disapprove of their wives' taking a decision that disregards his objection even more than patriachs in non-Western families. This disapproval is positively correlated with their degree of autonomy, as measured by the variable dependence. In other words, male-dominated Western families seem to represent a somewhat different type of patriarchy than the respective Indian and Turkish families, the reasons of which may be explainable by the theory of gender- versus sex-role structure of societies (Illich, 1983).



Egalitarian Western and non-Western families differ also with respect to the correlation between dependence (which, in this case, may be better labeled "respect for their spouse's will") and degree of being affected by their partner's disregard. Indian and Turkish husbands are more affected by their partner's disregard the more they themselves respect their wife's opinion, while no such correlation turned up with Western husbands. One may consider such Western families as living a kind of mutually autonomous, but competitive and role-integrated relationship, where the spouses act relatively detached from each others' opinion. Non-Western families (or at least their husbands), on the other hand, seem to decide more according to mutual concern — less autonomous, but more or less egalitarian. We admit, however, that without further data on this subject these conclusions remain highly speculative.

In the present study, marital harmony had a significant effect on interdependence, suggesting that happy couples are more interdependent than unhappy couples. This result is in line with other studies suggesting that satisfaction leads to more closeness and interdependence; but assuming a circular effect, interdependence also may lead to higher satisfaction (Gilmoure & Duck, 1986; Hinde, 1979; Kirchler & Wagner, 1987).

In summary, we found that there is a lesser degree of average interdependence between spouses in private purchasing decisions in more traditional, patriarchal societies than in Western countries with their ideology of marital equality. This was indicated specifically by the finding that sex-differences in autonomy versus dependence appeared only within the Western, and not in the Indian and Turkish, samples. At first sight, this finding appears to be counter-intuitive. However, it was expected on the basis of the conception of male/female role-segregation in traditional societies. It needs to be stated here that relative autonomy of spouses does not necessarily imply equality of power; on the contrary, intrafamilial dominance in India and Turkey leans definitely towards patriarchy. What the findings indicate, however, is that power and autonomy versus dependence are not two necessarily parallel phenomena. Under certain historical conditions they may diverge, such that

male dominance in the family is compatible with both high mutual interdependence as well as a high degree of autonomy of spouses, depending upon the traditional pattern of role-segregation versus role-integration. Traditional patriarchal power defines dominance regarding matters that affect the family whole and outside family matters, whereas spousal autonomy resulting from role-segregation pertains to the majority of within-family chores and personal matters.<sup>9</sup>

A word of caution is in order here: We do not, of course, intend to state that Austria and the USA on the one hand and India and Turkey on the other hand represent pairs of countries with highly similar culturally prescribed family role relationships. There are far more differences than concordances that demand additional consideration. What we mean, however, is that social psychological analyses of power relationships and of related interdependence in close relationships should specify the level and the field of family life where power and dependence are investigated, and they should include, within their explanatory scope, (Putnam, 1973) both the underlying cultural habitus (Bourdieu, 1980) and the social representations of subjects about their social environment (Jodelet, in press; Moscovici, 1984) that guide perception and action in everyday life. To achieve this, social psychology needs to pay more attention to the findings and conceptions of sociology, history, and anthropology.

To speculate for a moment, the impression from the data is that the concept of patriarchy in more traditional societies departs significantly from the concept of male power and sexism in Western industrialized societies. Thus, Illich's (1983) controversial conclusion may be correct that, in societies which preserve some flavor of a vernacular gender-role structure, the position of women in the family implies autonomy in many fields, which is not threatened immediately by men's competition and vice-versa. Despite, or because of that, patriarchy in such societies looms large as an all pervasive cultural feature. However, as Rogers (1975) has shown for traditional French rural communities, this type of patriarchy may take on the character of a myth, expressed primarily in cultural symbolism and large scale societal activities of men outside of

everyday life. On the other hand, male power in societies structured according to mutually interchangeable sex-roles entails a competitive relationship and high interdependence between men and women. This quasi-egalitarian competition finally provides the soil for what is experienced as sexual discrimination, not only in the society at large, but even more so in everyday activities.

## NOTES

1. Applying the term "developing" to countries like India and/or Turkey is, of course, questionable. If we do use the terms "developing" and "non-Western" interchangeably, we do so in a very loose way as a means to discriminate these countries from Austria and the USA without the intention of implying any specific economic status. We could have used the term "collectivist" as it is a current concept in cross-cultural psychology, but this would have implied too much of theory that might have mixed unduly with the theories we have applied.

When they are referred to jointly the names of countries appear in alphabetical order.

2. A complete version of the material can be obtained upon request. More details can also be found in Wagner et al., 1984.

3. We thought that purchasing in order to satisfy a personal wish would be a rather common theme in all of the four countries (see Green et al., 1983, for a cross-national study of purchasing behavior), and therefore relatively easy to imagine. Also, capitalist money economy imposes certain rules on the economic subjects that do not vary considerably between urban cultures in different capitalist nations, for example, the law of scarcity (Illich, 1983, p. 145f; Samuelson, 1980). This comparability of economic preconditions was thought to assure comparability of purchasing conflicts in different nations.

4. The design, crosscutting two action alternatives of one person with actions of another person, was derived from Kelley and Thibaut's (1978) interdependence matrix approach. We altered the design in such a way that the spouses disposed of complementary sets of action alternatives, such as buying versus not buying (the active role) and agreeing versus disagreeing (the passive role), respectively. This approach has already been applied to purchasing situations (Kirchler & Wagner; Wagner et al., 1984). It pictures an interdependence situation, which allows power and dominance to be conceived of as interaction constructs, rather than as attributes of individuals (Rollins & Bahr, 1976; Scanzoni & Fox, 1980).

5. Of course, there are a variety of socio-economic differences between the samples studied here, which also are interrelated with cultural conceptions of marriage and family norms. The average and appropriate age for marrying, for example, differs according to local norms and rules. The same applies to the "normal" number of children a family ought to bring up, as well as variations in educational level and income. So far, it has been utterly impossible to obtain strictly parallel samples in cross-cultural studies. Cross-tabulations of some socio-economic variables can be obtained upon request.

6. These scores resemble Kelley & Thibaut's fate-control scores. They are not identical, though, because we do not use all four cells to calculate them.

7. Some of these considerations were suggested by Denise Jodellet and Serge Moscovici in discussions with the first author.

8.  $Var(\text{sums}) = \text{Variance of the sums of well-being scores of active and passive spouse in each cell; } Var(\text{diffs}) = \text{Variance of the differences between well-being scores of active and passive spouse in each cell (see Kelley & Thibaut, 1978)}.$

9. H. C. Triandis suggested to us that, according to F. L. K. Hsu, horizontal relationships are considered more important in individualist (Austria and the USA) than in collectivist (India and Turkey) cultures. Such an interpretation would fit well onto the present data, if one considers wife-husband relationships as horizontal, and our measure of interdependence as indicating importance. However, wife-husband relationships in collectivist and, in the majority of the cases, highly patriarchal societies do not appear to us as horizontal. If vertical means hierarchical power relationships, such a power hierarchy can be observed between the patriarch and his wife. Consequently, marital relationships would be vertical in patriarchal societies; but horizontal in non-patriarchal societies. Labelling relationships as horizontal versus vertical needs to take into account the intracultural social definition of these formal-descriptive terms.

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