Different games for different motives: Comment on Haesevoets, Folmer, and Van Hiel (2015)
- Author(s)
- Isabel Thielmann, Robert Böhm, Benjamin E. Hilbig
- Abstract
Recently, Haesevoets, Folmer, and Van Hiel (2015) strongly questioned the comparability and equivalence of different mixed‐motive situations as modelled in economic games. Particularly, the authors found that different games correlated only weakly on average and loaded on two separate factors. In turn, personality traits failed to consistently account for behavioural tendencies across games. Contrary to the conclusions of Haesevoets et al., these findings are actually perfectly in line with the game‐theoretic understanding of the different economic games. If one considers the variety of specific motives underlying decisions in different games, Haesevoets et al.'s findings actually support the validity of different games rather than questioning it. This, in turn, emphasizes the necessity for the plethora of different games that have been developed over decades in economics and psychology.
- Organisation(s)
- External organisation(s)
- Universität Koblenz-Landau, Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen, Universität Mannheim
- Journal
- European Journal of Personality
- Volume
- 29
- Pages
- 506-508
- No. of pages
- 3
- ISSN
- 0890-2070
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1002/per.2007
- Publication date
- 07-2015
- Peer reviewed
- Yes
- Austrian Fields of Science 2012
- 501021 Social psychology
- ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Psychology
- Portal url
- https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/different-games-for-different-motives-comment-on-haesevoets-folmer-and-van-hiel-2015(a95b84c4-38ff-4b98-b569-fa5aa32f46c9).html