Inequitable wages and tax evasion

Author(s)
Linda Dezsö, James Alm, Erico Kirchler
Abstract

In a two-stage lab experiment, we examine whether wage inequity has a greater impact on tax compliance and on the beliefs about peers' compliance levels among the wronged when it results from intentional human choice versus a random mechanism. Subjects are organized into groups of six. In the first stage, we perform a wage inequity manipulation by assigning equitable or inequitable wages to subjects as remuneration for a real-effort task. In the second stage, subjects are prompted to report their incomes, of which a certain percent is deducted but not redistributed between them. Then, subjects state their incentivized beliefs about the mean of the declared-to-true income ratio among their group members. We find that tax compliance and beliefs are eroded when wage inequity stems from intentional human choice but not when it is due to randomness. Consequently, it is not inequity per se that reduces tax compliance and corrupts beliefs, but rather when inequity is due to a human choice. Our results demonstrate that incidental unfairness in the form of intentional wage inequity adversely affects tax compliance and beliefs about peers' compliance levels. In conclusion, intentional wage inequity can be harmful for society. Preregistered at aspredicted.com #36099.

Organisation(s)
Vienna Center for Experimental Economics, Department of Occupational, Economic and Social Psychology
External organisation(s)
Tulane University
Journal
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Volume
96
Pages
1-14
No. of pages
14
ISSN
2214-8043
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2021.101811
Publication date
07-2020
Peer reviewed
Yes
Austrian Fields of Science 2012
502045 Behavioural economics, 501002 Applied psychology, 501029 Economic psychology
Keywords
ASJC Scopus subject areas
General Social Sciences, Economics and Econometrics, Applied Psychology
Portal url
https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/en/publications/9a84825e-3bb3-4216-b04c-e6a6e27b0c94